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Central Intelligence Agency



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**DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE**

28 January 1982

**IMPLICATIONS OF THE DOZIER CASE FOR THE RED BRIGADES:  
AN EARLY ASSESSMENT**Summary

The conclusion of the Dozier kidnapping will be viewed by the Red Brigades as a humiliating defeat inflicted by the Brigades' principal enemy, the Italian Government. It imposes immediate pressure on the Brigades to attempt another spectacular incident to regain credibility. The manhunt for Dozier has damaged the operational abilities of some of the columns: the Rome and Veneto columns, which were hit hardest, may not be capable of carrying out a major operation anytime soon. The Dozier incident may deepen ideological fissures between factions of the Brigades, strengthening the position of those advocating attacks on traditional Brigades' targets, including Italians involved in the commercial, industrial or legal sectors.

This memorandum was prepared for the Office for Combatting Terrorism, Department of State. It was drafted by [redacted] 25X1 of the International Terrorism Center, Office of Global Issues. It contains information received by 1000, 28 January 1982. Questions and comments should be directed to the Chief, International Terrorism Center at [redacted] 25X1

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The End

Italian counterterrorist squads rescued General Dozier from a safehouse early in the morning of 28 January in a thoroughly professional operation. The safehouse was overrun by a unit of the regular police, not the carabinieri as originally believed. The police also raided two other safehouses at approximately the same time. Dozier's guards offered no resistance,

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The stage was set for the rescue operation after an imprisoned Brigades member and an at-large member of the Veneto column decided to cooperate with authorities in the hopes of collecting the reward money offered by the "Friends of Dozier".

Police were given the locations of three safehouses, although the Brigades members did not know at which locale Dozier was being kept. The Italian authorities proceeded with caution and were able to launch their assault without the Brigades obtaining forewarning.

The Damage

The successful assault and the immediate surrender of Dozier's captors is a severe tactical and humiliating propaganda blow to the Brigades. The Italian media and the Government will be quick to exploit this. The remaining at-large members of the group that kidnapped Dozier probably are on the run or deep underground. If the Italians can quickly exploit those arrested, more arrests and damage to Brigades capabilities will ensue.

The Italian manhunt for General Dozier was unprecedented, even in the Moro case, and has severely damaged the Brigades in the Veneto area and in Rome. Over 50 Brigades suspects have been arrested, including Giovanni Senzani, head of the Rome column. Safehouses have been overrun, and documents and weapons seized. Several planned spectacular terrorist

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A total accounting of seized weapons is still lacking, but it appears a sizeable portion of the Brigades' supply of standoff weaponry has been captured. According to some reports, the Italians also seized numerous documents, which may shed light on Brigades' operations and organizational structure.

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The Brigades will now be under heavy pressure to carry out another operation to regain credibility among their members, their supporters, and the Italian populace. The timing of the next operation will depend in part on whether Italian authorities maintain police pressure against the Brigades. The Brigades must also assume that some of their arrested members may be providing the police with names and other information.

There will be a tendency among some Brigades members to go to ground until the pressure is eased. Countering this will be pressure from the Brigades leadership to recover by striking at "imperialism." Another attack against a senior US military or diplomatic official would definitely bring the entire Italian security force to bear on the Brigades and compound the damage already done by the Dozier case.

Brigades' objectives in the immediate future may include softer targets such as police officials or prison officers. The Brigades may also seek to assassinate or kidnap an Italian political figure. Assassination may be the preferred tactic for the near term while the Brigades try to rebuild. Assassination operations involve far less logistical work and expose fewer personnel. The Brigades may also consider targetting lower ranking US military or diplomatic personnel or their dependents who are less well-protected.

### Dissension

From the Brigades' perspective, the disastrous conclusion to the Dozier case strengthens the position of the traditionalists within the organization who are inclined to attack the manifestations of "imperialism" within the Italian state and economy. Thus, those who favor attacking the judiciary, police, and prison officials can point out that the Dozier case brought unacceptable damage and pressures on the organization. Those who believe in worker agitation and attacks on industrialists and factory foremen can make the same argument.

Those members who argued for the internationalization of the Brigades' struggle will be hard-pressed to defend their position that striking at NATO officials is a good tactic for the organization. The call in the first Dozier communique for a common front with other West European terrorist groups has been met with silence by those groups.

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Neither the provisional Irish Republic Army, nor Basque ETA have even issued statements offering support. The West German Red Army Faction has also been silent, although we continue to believe that the RAF has not abandoned plans for future attacks on US targets. The RAF, however, is likely to read the Dozier case as indicating assassination attacks are more promising and less risky than kidnappings.

The ideological splits between various factions of the Brigades will not cause the dissolution of the organization. The group will probably go through an extended period of self-criticism and examination. In particular, decision-making cadre will have to reconsider how best to implement the Strategic Directive. If the Veneto column jumped the gun in kidnapping Dozier before the rest of the organization was either apprised of the operation or had sanctioned it, the Strategic Directorate will also have to tighten command and control procedures within the Brigades.

#### Prognosis

The Brigades have been badly hurt by the Dozier case, although not mortally. The case will be examined by the group in both ideological and tactical terms, which could well produce as yet unforeseen modifications in Brigades' command and control, tactical objectives, ideological emphasis and modus operandi. The police have over 50 terrorists in custody, some of whom are providing information. This will lead to more intelligence and further police actions against the group. The Italian authorities have momentum, and further police actions should suppress the Brigades for the near term. The enormous pressures on the Brigades' leadership to regain their credibility by carrying out another spectacular incident suggests that the prudent course for US and Italian authorities is to anticipate another major attack in the near future.

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